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Previous research analyzing within-family education resource alloca-
tion usually employs the sibship and birth order of a child as ex-
planatory variables. We argue in this paper that to correctly char-
acterize the resource competition and support scenario within a fam-
ily, one should identify the Sex, Seniority, and most importantly Age
Diﬀerence of a child’s sibling structure, and hence we call our analysis
a SSAD model of family resource allocation. We show that siblings
with diﬀerent combinations of SSAD may play distinct roles in family
resource allocation. Ignoring such facts may distort the signiﬁcance
and/or direction of the prediction. We support our analysis with em-
pirical evidence using data from Taiwan.
11 Introduction
There were many studies in the past to analyze the eﬀect of sibship or birth
order on children’s education achievement, measured by their performance
scores or years of schooling. The general conclusion is that a child’s education
achievement is negatively aﬀected by his or her sibship, but the eﬀect of birth
order is ambiguous.3
Leaving aside the case of primogeniture primarily in some ancient peri-
ods, unequal parental treatment to children of speciﬁc birth order does not
seem to have any strong theoretical support.4 Since we do not have any
established theory in psychology to support parents’ subjective unequal al-
truism toward children of various birth orders, if a child of a particular birth
order does turn out to perform better, then the revealed connection between
child performance and birth order must involve some objective factors in the
environment that are associated with birth order. The purpose of this pa-
per is to disentangle, both conceptually and empirically, the complicated
objective factors for which birth order might be used as a proxy, and to clar-
ify the competing and supporting relationship among siblings for education
resources.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we clarify
some conceptual ideas associated with the previous discussion of birth order
3Related literature abounds. For earlier discussions in psychology and sociology, see
Altus (1966), Adams (1972), Schooler (1972), Zajonc (1976), and Davis (1977). Recent
research using more reﬁned data or analysis can be found in Behrman and Taubman (1986),
Birdsall (1991), Kessler (1991), Parish and Willis (1993), Butcher and Case (1994), and
Kuo and Hauser (1997).
4Galton (1874) believed that the custom of primogeniture is the reason why the ﬁrst-
born has a better achievement in the sample he observed. Chu (1991) provided some
theoretical arguments behind primogeniture in ancient periods. Focusing on the child
mortality of India, Das Gupta (1987) argued that the sex discrimination against girls may
particularly be on the ones with higher birth orders. More details will be given later.
1in the literature. We then present the proposed analysis and derive some
testable implications in section 3. We argue that to correctly characterize
the resource competition and support scenario within a family, one must
consider the Sex, Seniority, and most important Age Diﬀerence of a child’s
sibling structure, and hence we call the proposed analysis a SSAD model
of family resource allocation. Section 4 introduces the econometric model
used in the paper whereas section 5 provides a description of the data and
the relevant education system in Taiwan. The empirical result is presented
in section 6, which shows that siblings with diﬀerent combinations of SSAD
may play distinct roles in family resource allocation. Ignoring such facts may
distort the signiﬁcance and/or direction of the empirical prediction. The ﬁnal
section concludes.
2 Clarifying Some Conceptual Issues
Let us ﬁrst summarize the arguments that have been proposed in the liter-
ature to support the possible correlation between a child’s birth order and
his or her education achievement. We then examine the complex proxy roles
behind the birth-order variable. The arguments include:
1. Children with higher birth orders tend to be born by older mothers,
and hence they are more likely to have weaker natural endowments,
dizygotic multiple births, or even birth defects; Behrman and Taubman
(1986).
2. Children with higher birth orders tend to receive better care from their
parents, who are more experienced in child caring; Kessler (1991).
3. Children with higher birth orders often face a later and usually better
environment in a growing economy, either in the macro environment
2they face in general, or in their families in particular, and hence they
tend to receive a better education; Davis (1977).
4. Children with lower birth orders have less competitors in family re-
sources, and thereby are at an advantage in family education support;
Kessler (1991).
5. Children with higher birth orders often obtain help or care, sometimes
even ﬁnancial support, from elder siblings, and therefore can receive a
better education; Davis (1977).
6. Children of lower birth orders (especially females) are likely to receive
less education, because their parents tend to let them go into the job
market early in order to help their younger siblings’ education; Parish
and Willis (1993).5
The above-mentioned, to some extent mutually conﬂicting, “explana-
tions” for the eﬀect of birth order actually are not characterizations of the
impact of birth order per se. They often refer to other socioeconomic vari-
ables, of which birth order is just a related proxy. Let us examine their
meanings in detail below.
Social Background and Family Characteristics: Evidently, the risk of birth
defection speciﬁed in item 1 is better captured by the birth age of the mother,
rather than by the birth order of the child. Parents’ ability in taking care
of their children listed in item 2 is dependent not only on the number of
senior siblings of the child, but also (if not more) on parents’ age, social
5Das Gupta (1987) showed that female children of higher birth orders are likely to
receive less food and nutrition, because parents may have a preference for “removing
unwanted daughters as early as possible” (p.93). The decision of nutrition resource allo-
cation she discussed aﬀects the survival probability of children, whereas our focus is on
the achievement of the survived children.
3experience, human capital, and many other factors. As such, birth order is
actually a proxy of other variables. Concerning item 3 above, the capacity of
supporting a child’s education should depend on the economic status of the
parent and the society; again the birth-order variable is used to carry other
family background information.
The Importance of Sibling Age Diﬀerence: The reasons characterized in
items 4 to 6 are related to the sibling structure faced by the child in question,
and deserve a further investigation. As we shall explain below, whether a
child of a particular birth order can receive more resources critically hinges
upon the age diﬀerence between the child and his or her neighboring siblings.
For instance, consider two children, ordered respectively ﬁrst and second in
a family. Suppose the age diﬀerence between the two siblings is 10. We can
then think of the following two impacts: i) At the time when the parent is
considering whether to let the ﬁrst child go to college, if the family budget
is tight and if parents foresee that they are more capable of supporting the
second child’s college expenses after 10 years of savings, then they may decide
to let their ﬁrst child enter the labor market. ii) At the time when parents
are considering whether to let the second child go to college, the ﬁrst child
may have been in the labor market for a while, and is more likely to play a
supporting role to the second child. Thus, for families with a tight budget
larger age diﬀerence between two siblings is likely to be detrimental to the
senior and helpful to the junior in college education.
Now we consider the second possibility that these two siblings are a pair
of twins or have a 1-year age diﬀerence. In this case, sacriﬁcing the elder
child does not create as much ﬁnancial advantage to the parents as in the
case of a 10-year age diﬀerence.6 If the parents can only aﬀord one child’s
education expenses, then the child chosen by the parents is less likely to
be related to his or her birth order. The third possibility is that the age
6The resource competition between two siblings will be discussed in more detail later.
4diﬀerence is somewhere in between, say 5 years. The ﬁrst child to some
limited extent can then relieve the parents’ ﬁnancial burden. On the other
hand, the two children with a 5-year age diﬀerence may also compete for
education resources from their parents at the same time. As such, the third
scenario seems to be between the 10-year age diﬀerence case and the twin
case.
In summary, we see that birth order alone is not necessarily related to
the resource concerns within the family; what is crucial is the age diﬀerence
between the child in question and his or her siblings.7
The Confusing Sibship Eﬀect: As the concern of age diﬀerence is brought
up, we also realize that the sibship variable may also carry misleading in-
formation. For example, consider again two extreme cases of three siblings.
The ﬁrst case is a 1-year interval between every two consecutive births, and
the second case is a 7-year interval between two consecutive births. Evi-
dently, the former case is more likely to cause resource competition between
the three children, and the latter case is likely to generate strong support
for the youngest child. Thus, without taking into account the age diﬀerence
factor, the sibship variable simply carries too much (possibly conﬂicting) in-
formation to be instructive. As a result, the corresponding empirical analysis
may generate an estimate either insigniﬁcant or diluted in size.
Seniority Asymmetry: Another related point from the above discussion
is the senior-junior asymmetry between siblings. Typically, it seems intu-
itive that a younger child is less likely to support his or her elder siblings
7Notice that our argument is consistent with, but diﬀerent from, the conﬂuence theory
of psychologists. The conﬂuence theory proposed by Zajonc (1976) hypothesizes that the
development of a child’s intelligence depends on that of all other family members, who
interact with the child in question. Zajonc pointed out that one way of characterizing the
intellectual environment of a family is its age conﬁguration. In our model, the supporting
role of an elder sibling can arise not because of his or her possibly more mature intelligence,
but because of the interplay of resource constraints.
5within a reasonable range of age diﬀerences, whereas an elder child may ei-
ther compete with or support for his or her younger siblings. This kind of
seniority asymmetry, to our knowledge, has never been taken into account
in the previous literature.
Gender Diﬀerence: The ﬁnal complexity is the interaction between birth
order and child sex characterized in item 6 above, and also brieﬂy mentioned
in Schooler (1972) and Butcher and Case (1994). Given the same sibship and
birth order, in many societies a female child is more likely to play a supporting
rather than a competing role (Greenhalgh 1985). We should note that in
societies with potential gender-speciﬁc diﬀerential treatment, the interplay of
such age diﬀerences with child gender may also show a sophisticated pattern.
3 Sibling Age Diﬀerences and Family
Resource Allocation
Consider the simplest situation where the parent of a household has two chil-
dren. Each child faces two education choices: either to enter the job market
after the mandatory education, say 12 years, or continue on to college edu-
cation, say for another 4 years. Since our focus is on resource allocation, we
normalize the time to be t = 0 when the ﬁrst child ﬁnishes his or her manda-
tory education. The age diﬀerence between these two children is denoted
∆A.
3.1 Constrained Utility Maximization
Let the family consumption at time t be denoted by ct. For simplicity, we
assume that the discount rate is zero. The family head wishes to maximize
6the following lifetime utility:
Z T
0
u(ct)dt + V (E1;E2); (1)
where u is the usual increasing concave function, T is the time bound of the
parent’s planning horizon, E1;E2 2 f0;1g with Ei = 1(0); i = 1;2 indicating
that child i gets (does not get) a college degree, and V characterizes the
parent’s utility from their children’s education achievement. If parents are
assumed to favor a child of a particular birth order, then essentially any
unequal education resource allocation is possible. Hence, we rule out this
ad hoc assumption and concentrate on the possible impact created by the
budget constraint of the family. We therefore assume V (0;1) = V (1;0) for
the time being, meaning that the parent does not have a priori reasons to
favor one of the two children, and we shall relax this assumption later.
We propose the following assumptions and derive their implications.
Assumptions: (A1) there is no capital market for student loans; (A2) edu-
cated children do not make contribution to the parents’ budget.
Of course, the above assumptions are not entirely consistent with the reality
in many societies. For instance, in all economies there are alsways some
formal or informal capital markets for all kinds of needs; but as long as these
markets are imperfect, parental supports are important and our analysis goes
through. Other variations of these assumptions will also be discussed later
in the paper.
Let It be the parent’s exogenous income at t, at be the parent’s assets, ˙ at
be the instantaneous change of at, and r be the interest rate. To maximize
the utility function in expression (??), the parent faces the following budget
constraint:
ct + ntp  It + rat  ˙ at; a0 given; (2)
where p is the instantaneous expenses of going to college, and nt 2 f0;1;2g
is the number of children going to college at t. In our later analysis, we shall
7assume that inﬂationary factors have been controlled so that r in the above
expression is the real interest rate and p is a constant. Note that if college
education takes 4 years, then the expenditure ﬂow p has to last 4 years for
each child to change his or her E from 0 to 1.8
3.2 Implications
What we shall emphasize in this paper is the postponement eﬀect caused by
sibling age diﬀerences in family resource allocation. We will have this eﬀect
mainly because of Assumptions (A1) and (A2). Because there is no market
for student loans, children’s education will rely on savings by their parents.
Thus, a longer period of savings will entail a more likely education support.
Below we shall present our points one by one.9
Age Diﬀerence between Siblings: If parents are constrained in their bud-
get so that they can allow only one child to go to college, then sacriﬁcing
the ﬁrst child’s education has the advantage of postponing the related expen-
diture, which can be saved and can help expand the budget set for the life
cycle planning. As long as parents are indiﬀerent between the two children
(V (1;0) = V (0;1)), they should be willing to do this. The implication of
this result is the disadvantageous situation faced by the elder child, espe-
cially when a parent’s ﬁnancial situation is suﬃcient to support only one
child’s college expenses. We shall call this the forced forbearance eﬀect of
the elder child. In addition, the disadvantage of the elder child increases
when the age diﬀerence between siblings increases. Furthermore, whatever
education the parents choose for their ﬁrst child, the education opportunity
for the second child improves as the age diﬀerence between the two children
8For simplicity, we assume away the complexity that a child may drop out of college, or
may stop a while after high school graduation before going to college. Taking into account
these complexities only makes the analysis tedious and does not change the insight.
9Technical details are available from the authors on request.
8increases.
Sex-speciﬁc Diﬀerential Treatment: So far we have assumed that V (0;1) =
V (1;0) to support our argument. Many researchers have pointed out, how-
ever, that there has been diﬀerential treatment against girls in many East
Asia countries.10 Suppose there is a strong preference against girls. On the
one hand, if the ﬁrst child is a boy and the second is a girl, then it can
be easily shown that our previous prediction can be overturned: parents
with strong enough gender preferences [V (1;0)  V (0;1) large] may still let
their elder boy undergo more education and suppress the opportunity of the
younger girl. On the other hand, if the ﬁrst child is a girl and the second a
boy, then the forbearance eﬀect of the ﬁrst child would be even stronger. The
above discussion suggests that, other than diﬀerentiating siblings according
to their age diﬀerences, male and female siblings should be treated diﬀerently
in the empirical analysis.
The Financial Support Eﬀect: If a parent decides to let the elder child
have E1 = 0 and go to work after high school, then at least for some time
this elder child may contribute some of his or her earnings and increase the
household income. This will also help relax the household budget constraint
and is called the ﬁnancial support eﬀect. The period of this ﬁnancial remit-
tance is unknown, because it usually stops or shrinks signiﬁcantly after the
working child gets married and begins his or her own household.
The Ambiguous Competition Eﬀect: Now consider a child C. If C has
a sibling B who has a small age diﬀerence with C, then their parents may
send either B or C to college, because the ﬁnancial advantage of postponing
the senior child (favoring the junior child) would be small. Thus, as far as
the education opportunity of B and C is concerned, there are two conﬂicting
eﬀects involved. 1) Other things being equal, a child’s probability of going
to college is reduced nearly by 1/2, because of the existence of a competing
10See e.g., Greenhalgh (1985) and Parish and Willis (1993).
9sibling.11 2) If parents let one child, say B, go to the labor market, then
his or her remittance can create a ﬁnancial support eﬀect for the family,
as argued above. It is possible that the parents originally cannot aﬀord
C’s college expenses without B’s remittance, but with such a remittance
from B, C’s opportunity of going to college increases. These two conﬂicting
eﬀects combined make us unable to predict the impact of adding a similar-
age sibling on a child’s education opportunity. In short, the impact on Child
C’s education opportunity from adding a senior or junior sibling who has a
small age diﬀerence with C is ambiguous.
So far our discussion has been restricted to the scenario with two children.
When there are more than 2 children in a family, the analysis is essentially
the same as before. Parents will have to exhaust all pairwise comparisons to
decide the education resource allocation. The competition, forbearance, or
supporting eﬀects evidently remain. A corresponding analysis is similar and
is therefore skipped.
In summary, the above discussion tells us that we should go beyond the
conventional argument that a child’s education is aﬀected by his or her birth
order and sibship. Below we shall investigate the competing and supporting
roles of siblings, taking into account all elements mentioned in the above
discussion. In particular, after controlling the socioeconomic background of
the economy and the family, we shall study the impact of siblings of diﬀerent
SSAD groups on a particular child’s education achievement.
11Take the extreme case of a twin as an example: if the parents can aﬀord only one
child’s college expenses, then they may let either one go to college, depending on their
preferences and the children’s relative performance.
104 Empirical Setting
Let Sik be the education achievement of child k in family i. We suppose
that Sik is inﬂuenced by three major factors. First, the Societal Economic
Status (denoted SESik for child k in family i) reveals the general economic
condition of the society faced by the family head in question. Factor SES
plays a role, because education takes resources, and only suﬃciently rich
economies (which do not need children to help sustain the family’s basic
consumption) can support children to receive a higher education. In general,
this economic background can be captured by the father’s birth year or birth
cohort.
The second factor is the Family Economic Status the child faces (denoted
FESik). If the father is the key income earner, then this variable should be
characterized by the father’s life-cycle income. Because most data sets do
not have such detailed records of life-cycle parental incomes, we adopt the
usual approach and treat the father’s education as a proxy of his lifetime
wealth. Other transitory ﬂuctuations are assumed to be absorbed by the
error term. The same argument appplies to mothers and we also include
mother’s education in our analysis.
The above-mentioned two groups of factors (SES and FES) control the
objective environment a child faces in our empirical analysis. The third
category of variables, the competing or supporting factors among siblings, is
the focus of our investigation, and they are to be introduced below. Unlike
the conﬂuence theory of Zajonc’s (1976), where the author used the average
age of family members to capture the intelligence maturity faced by a child,
our scenario of competition and supporting is more reﬁned. As we argued
in sections 2 and 3, a child’s siblings should be separated into several SSAD
groups in order to capture the true interactions within a family. We hope
that this reﬁnement can help clarify the ambiguous eﬀects of sibship and
11birth order raised in the previous literature.
For child k in family i, let the competing/supporting inﬂuence from junior
female siblings be denoted IJFik. Similarly, IJMik, ISFik, and ISMik denote
respectively the inﬂuence from junior male, senior female, and senior male
siblings. Taking into account these impacts, Sik can be written as
Sik = f(SESik;FESik;IJFik;IJMik;ISFik;ISMik): (3)
In equation (??), the ﬁrst two elements control the environment of the soci-
ety and the household, and the remaining four capture the between-sibling
resource interactions.
Let JF represent the set of a child’s junior female siblings, and let JM,
SF and SM be similarly deﬁned. To capture the importance of sibling age
diﬀerences, we further separate the siblings in JF, JM, SF, and SM categories
into three age groups, and let N3, N47, and N8+ denote the number of
siblings whose age diﬀerence with the child in question is less than or equal to
3, between 4 and 7, and larger than or equal to 8, respectively. Leaving aside
the within-group constant term, which is to be absorbed into the regression
constant, we can characterize the impact from siblings in group g 2 G 
fJF;JM;SF;SMg as
Ig = ag(N3
)g + bg(N47)g + cg(N8
+)g;
where ag, bg; and cg are three coeﬃcients for group g.
Suppose the above-mentioned factors each play the role of an additive or
multiplicative adjustment factor in inﬂuencing child k’s schooling.12 Equa-
tion (??) can then be written as13




)g + bg(N47)g + cg(N8
+)g] + ik; (4)
12If the eﬀect is multiplicative, then taking a logorithm will transform it into an additive
form.
13In terms of the psychology literature, IJF, IJM, ISF, and ISM respectively char-
acterize the conﬂuence eﬀect from siblings of diﬀerent groups. The distinction here is that
12where G consists of sibling categories. Let the variables that inﬂuence SES
and FES be jointly characterized by a vector Xik, and let the total inﬂuence
be Xik. Substituting this speciﬁcation into Eq. (??), we now have the
following expression:




)g + bg(N47)g + cg(N8
+)g] + ik: (5)
In equation (??), because of the existence of a common family eﬀect for
all siblings in family i, the errors ik are not independently distributed. Any
least squares estimation failing to take into account this dependence will re-
sult in an ineﬃcient estimation. Furthermore, as pointed out by Griliches
(1979), applying the ﬁxed eﬀect model to the family context may exacer-
bate other econometric problems such as measurement errors and variable
endogeneity and may interfere with the estimation of common-to-all-sibling
variables. Care must be exercised. To overcome these potential problems in
the estimation, we compute the covariance matrix of the estimates using the
consistent method for serial correlation and conditional heteroskedasticity;
see Newey and West (1987), White (1980), and Huber (1967).
5 Data Description and Social Background
5.1 Data and Variable Deﬁnitions
The data set we use is from the ﬁrst wave of PSFD (Panel Study of Family
Dynamics) survey conducted in Taiwan.14 Since Taiwan is a well-known area
we explicitly assume seniority asymmetry and gender diﬀerences. Moreover, equation (4)
has a theoretical foundation described in section 2, and it has controlled the interactions
of social and family economic environments. These modiﬁcations allow sophisticated in-
teractions among distinct sibling groups, which would not appear in a conﬂuence model.
14The purpose of this survey is to construct a unique panel in a Chinese society. The
project, entitled PSFD, was conducted with the support of the Chiang Ching-Kuo (CCK)
13undergoing rapid economic and demographic transitions,15 parents’ attitude
toward their children’s education is expected to change signiﬁcantly from the
past. Against this changing background, one is more likely to observe co-
existing samples with contrasting socioeconomic characteristics, which are
particularly appropriate for the empirical study of family behavior.
The ﬁrst wave of PSFD survey conducted during 1999 – 2003 includes
roughly 4,000 respondents from cohorts born between 1934 and 1974 (in-
clusive). The questionaire covers detailed socio-economic information about
family members of the interviewed individual as well as their relations with
each other. In particular, for each randomly-sampled respondent, informa-
tion concerning the education background of almost all of his or her siblings
was also collected. ¿From the information of the respondent and his (her)
siblings, we construct family-siblings data set in order to estimate the dif-
ferential education achievement among siblings. After deleting observations
with missing variables, the ﬁnal sample size is 10,764 children from 2,626
families.
The deﬁnition, sample mean, and standard deviation of the variables
used in our empirical analysis are listed in Table 1. As one can see from the
Table, the average year of schooling for males is longer than that of females,
revealing a possible pattern of sex-speciﬁc diﬀerential treatment. The same
phenomenon is also reﬂected in the diﬀerence of years of schooling between
the father and mother of a respondent.
Insert Table 1 about here.
foundation, the National Science Council, and Academia Sinica of Taiwan, under the
guidance of Gary Becker, Angus Deaton, Robert Hauser, James Heckman, Cheng Hsiao,
Ronald Lee, William Parish, George Tiao, Jim Vaupel, Arthur Wolf, Cyrus Chu, and other
local collaborators. For details, see http://psfd.sinica.edu.tw.
15See Chu and Lee (2000) for more details.
145.2 The Education System in Taiwan
Since our purpose is to analyze the causes of diﬀerential education achieve-
ment among siblings, we feel obliged to introduce the education system in
Taiwan. There are ﬁve main tiers of regular schools in Taiwan, namely el-
ementary (6 years), junior high (3 years), high school (3 years), college (4
years) and graduate schools, together with some supplementary vocational
schools. Although various schools used to screen their own students, starting
from 1950 most schools in Taiwan have participated in the joint entrance
examinations (JEE) to exercise student screening. As one can see, nearly all
our sampled respondents are subject to the JEE system. Before 1968, for the
entrance from elementary to junior high, from junior high to high school, or
from high school to college, each person needed to go through a respective
JEE. The high school to college JEE was nationwide, whereas the others
were held in separate districts, within which thousands of students join the
competition. After 1968, the mandatory education extended from six to nine
years, and hence the JEE from elementary to junior high was abolished.
In Taiwan, because i) the training of teachers of all school tiers was mo-
nopolized by national normal colleges, ii) the salary scales of teachers and
professors are seniority-based, and iii) the university professor licensure was
uniformly regulated by the Ministry of Education in most relevant periods
of our study,16 there is not much a priori reasons to expect quality diﬀer-
ences among school teachers. Moreover, the tuition upper bound of private
schools regulated by the government also renders constraints to their qual-
ity improvement. Thus, most parents and students in Taiwan prefer to go
to the less-expensive public schools and universities rather than the private
16The monopoly of training teachers was ﬁnally abolished in 1997 and the uniform pro-
fessor licensure system was decentralized in 1991; but these recent changes could not have
aﬀected the previous decisions of the respondents. For a related discussion of controlling
school quality, see Behrman and Birdsall (1983).
15ones. The JEE ranks all lower-tier graduates according to their JEE scores,
and higher-score students are allowed to choose schools (or departments)
to enter before lower-score students do. In the end, there are always some
disappointed students who do not have any desirable match.17
The JEE in Taiwan is basically a written exam and therefore the cri-
terion of admission is very uniform. Given the above-mentioned rigid JEE
system, whether a student can enter a higher tier school or college depends
on his or her ability as well as the resources devoted by his or her parents
(e.g., for after-school tutoring). The resource devotion from parents to chil-
dren of course depends on the parents’ education background, ethnicity, and
in particular their sex preferences and budget constraint. For instance, if
the parents have ﬁnancial constraints and are only able to aﬀord one child
to go to college, then child gender or birth order may play an important
role. In summary, the uniform JEE system in Taiwan makes all students’
upward-moving ladders relatively standard, and hence it is appropriate for
our econometric analysis.
5.3 Variable Choices
In our empirical analysis (??), most of the explanatory variables, such as
parents’ education, mother’s working status, and father’s birth cohort, fa-
ther’s ethnic background, are the same as those in the literature introduced
in sections 1 and 2. We also include the born-after-1956 dummy to capture
17For instance, in the year 2000, 125,498 students registered for the JEE of colleges. The
overall entrance rate from high school to college was 59.98%. The most-preferred college
in general was the National Taiwan University, which allowed only 3,244 students to enter.
Students whose scores were lower than the rank criterion of the various departments at
National Taiwan University had to choose other universities to study. In the same year,
there were 22,115 students participating the JEE from junior high to high school in the
Taipei area; corresponding ﬁgures in other areas are omitted.
16the eﬀect of the extension of mandatory education in 1968, which applies
to cohorts born since 1956. To capture the risk of birth defect from older
mothers (Item 1 listed in section 2), we include a dummy variable, which
equals 1 if the child in question was born when the mother was over 40 years
old and 0 otherwise.
Our strategy is to control the macroeconomic as well as family back-
grounds of a child and to investigate the eﬀect of sibship of various SSAD
groups on the child’s education Sik. These variables, according to our theo-
retical conjecture in section 2, are expected to have diﬀerent eﬀects on Sik.
6 Estimation Results
We ﬁrst run a benchmark model in Table 2, which is the case similar to
the traditional analysis. The signiﬁcant coeﬃcients associated with the fa-
ther’s birth cohort dummies indicate that younger parents who face a better
economic environment are more capable of supporting their children’s ed-
ucation. The signiﬁcant estimates of the father’s ethnicity dummies reveal
that Taiwan’s aborigines are relatively disadvantageous in education oppor-
tunity. Both these ﬁndings are consistent with our general perception. Other
explanatory variables such as parents’ education, mother’s working status,
child’s gender, and child birth dummy all have signiﬁcant coeﬃcients with
expected signs. The dummy of mother’s age (at the birth of the child),
however, is not signiﬁcant.
Insert Table 2 about here.
Other than the above-mentioned background variables, we ﬁnd that the
sibship is signiﬁcantly negative at the 1% level and that [birth-order]2 is
signiﬁcantly positive at the 5% level. These results tend to support the
general ﬁnding concerning the eﬀects of sibship and birth order. However, as
we argued in the previous discussion, such interpretations may be misleading.
17For instance, it may be the case that a 1-year older senior sibling does not
have any signiﬁcant impact on a child, while another 6-year older senior
sibling has a signiﬁcantly positive impact. As we mingle together these two
siblings into a sibship variable, we either ﬁnd the coeﬃcient insigniﬁcant, or
it remains signiﬁcant, but the eﬀect of the 6-year senior sibling is diluted. For
another instance, a boy with a high birth order may receive more education
not because of his birth order per se, but because his older female siblings
remit some income to support the parents. Thus, without diﬀerentiating
siblings with diﬀerent seniority-sex-age backgrounds, the superﬁcial eﬀect of
birth order may capture other factors and is diﬃcult to interpret.
6.1 Reﬁned Sibling Eﬀect
In Table 3 we present the results with SSAD-speciﬁc sibships as explanatory
variables. The theoretical predictions presented in section 3 show that, in a
family under a ﬁnancial constraint, the senior child may have to give up his
or her chance of education in order to support the younger ones, especially
when the younger ones’ age diﬀerence with the child in question is suﬃciently
large. These predictions are typically veriﬁed by the results of Table 3. As
one can see from the [All] column, which is based on the whole sample,
the marginal eﬀect of younger siblings with large age diﬀerences ( 8) on
the child’s education is negative, with a magnitude of roughly 0.46 years per
younger brother and 0.55 years per younger sister. These negative coeﬃcients
represent the forbearance eﬀects imposed on the senior child in question, as
predicted in section 3. It is noted that the corresponding coeﬃcient (-.46 or
-.55) is larger in absolute value than that of the overall sibship eﬀect -0.225
in Table 2. This reveals the dilution caused by mingling siblings who are
supposed to play diﬀerent roles. On the other hand, siblings with a small
age diﬀerence ([0;3]), either junior or senior, do not have a signiﬁcant impact
18on the child’s education, which is consistent with our implications derived.
Insert Table 3 about here.
The [All] column of Table 3 also shows that the eﬀects of female senior
siblings with an age diﬀerence of 4-7 and 8+ years are positive with asymp-
totic t-value of 2.60 and 1.63, respectively, indicating that they can help the
younger siblings’ education. While these eﬀects are signiﬁcant at the 1%
and 11% level, they are consistent with the results of Greenhalgh (1985) and
Parish and Willis (1993). Elder sisters with a large age diﬀerence [ 8] do
not help as much as the ones with [4;7] age diﬀerence; this may be due to
the termination of remittance of the former group after they form their own
households. As to the eﬀect of male senior siblings with an age diﬀerence of
8+, a signiﬁcantly positive coeﬃcient (5%) leads to the conclusion that elder
brothers with a large age diﬀerence [ 8] are also helpful for the younger
siblings’ education.
6.2 Sex Diﬀerences
It is believed that for children of diﬀerent sexes, the pressure and support
they have from siblings are diﬀerent. In a family with typical diﬀerential
treatment against girls, a parent is more likely to ask a senior female child
to forgo education than to ask a senior male. We therefore separate our
respondents into males and females and run the regression separately. The
results are presented in the [Female] and [Male] columns of Table 3.
¿From Table 3 we ﬁrst note that female respondents seem to be more
sensitive to the number of junior siblings, as revealed by the absolute values
of signiﬁcant coeﬃcients. For a male respondent, increasing one junior male
and female sibling with an age diﬀerence larger than 8 will reduce his own
year of education by 0.312 and 0.417 years respectively. However, if the
respondent is a female, then the same eﬀect increases to 0.578 and 0.671
19years, sizeably larger (in absolute value) than that of the male counterparts.
The [Female] and [Male] columns also reveal another interesting fact.
¿From the (signiﬁcant) coeﬃcients associated with elder brothers and sisters,
we ﬁnd that elder brothers and sisters are both helpful to the schooling of
female respondents, yet the results for the male sample show a diﬀerent
pattern. For the schooling of males, we ﬁnd that elder sisters (with age
diﬀerence of 4-7) are beneﬁcial while elder brothers (with age diﬀerence [ 3])
are detrimental. We also ﬁnd that older sisters are more helpful to young
siblings than older brothers. This seems to reveal that elder sisters are more
likely to be secondary income earners to a family.
A related phenomenon we ﬁnd is the following: We can separate the
environmental pressures a child faces (in terms of education opportunity)
into three categories: the father’s birth cohort characterizes the macro factor
from the economic environment, the schooling of parents captures the micro
economic pressure within family, and the 1956 dummy is a change in the
institutional pressure by increasing mandatory education from 6 to 9 years.
For these above-mentioned variables, we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcients associated
with the female sample are always larger than those of males, it suggests that
when the pressure increases, it is the female who is sacriﬁced; and when the
pressure reduces, it is also the female who beneﬁts more. This means that
girls are indeed the vulnerable group; they are the ones who absorb all kinds
of outside sensitivities.
To examine whether the SSAD-speciﬁc sibships behave diﬀerently for
male and female respondents, we rerun the regression with the whole sample
by adding the interaction terms of female dummy and SSAD-speciﬁc vari-
ables. The results are not listed in Table 3; but it does turn out that younger
siblings are more detrimental to the females than to the males. In addition,
younger siblings with large age diﬀerence are more detrimental to the females
than the ones with small age diﬀerence. A simple F test is performed to ex-
20amine whether the interaction terms are jointly zero. The corresponding F
statistic (F = 6:40 with degrees of freedom = 12;2625) indeed rejects the
hypothesis that the male and female groups have the same sets of coeﬃcients
associated with SSAD-speciﬁc sibships.
6.3 Diﬀerences Due to Fathers’ Cohorts
It is believed that parents are intrinsically altruistic toward all children, so
that their possible discrimination against girls (in terms of education resource
allocation) would be necessary only if the economic environment cannot al-
low them to support all their children’s education. To investigate the im-
pact of a changing economic environment, we separate our samples into two
groups, roughly of equal sizes, one with fathers born before 1930 and the
other born after 1930. Since the former group of parents is expected to face
more stringent economic conditions than the latter group, we suspect that
the regression results may be diﬀerent between the two groups.
Table 4 presents the results for the two groups. Comparing the two
columns of the table, we make the following observations. First, the support
eﬀect of senior siblings as shown by marginally signiﬁcant positive estimates
in the column of Old Cohort have changed to competing eﬀect shown by
the signiﬁcant negative estimates in Young Cohort column. Presumably the
improved economic environment implied that parents no longer needed the
ﬁnancial support from their older children. In fact, parents were more willing
to send their children into college, resulting in resource competition among
children regardless of their birth order. Second, the number of elder sisters
has no siginicant impact on a child’s education in the Young Cohort. This
indicates that the improvements in economic condition and parents’ educa-
tion have had a positive impact concerning discrimination against girls in
Taiwan. Third, for the young cohort group, the competing eﬀect of younger
21siblings (both brothers and sisters) have spreaded to all age diﬀerence cat-
egories. However, the magnitues of the estimates are proportional to age
diﬀerences. Therefore, young siblings with larger age diﬀerences continue to
be detrimental to the education of older children. For instance, consider the
case of young brothers in the Young Cohort column. The estimated impact
of a younger brother with age diﬀerence 8+ years is more than four times
of that of one with age diﬀerence less than 3 years. The same is true for
the younger sisters. These observations show that the importance of SSAD
in studying education resource allocation within a family continues to hold
regardless of the status of economic environment.
Insert Table 4 about here.
Another important implication of the results of Table 4 is related to the
“practice of family planning.” One might argue that family education resouce
allocation could be inﬂuenced by family planning and fertility. We examine
the history of family planning on Taiwan. The island-wide family planning
program on Taiwan began in 1964; see Chow (1974). And the acceptance
rates of contraceptive methods oﬀered by the program have increased steadily
since then. By the end of 1973, birth control became commonpractice and
nearly 50% of married couples adopted certain kinds of contraceptive devices.
Since we don’t have data available concerning family planning of the
sampled families, it seems reasonable to assume that families with fathers
born after 1930 (i.e. fathers in the Young cohort) were subject to the practice
of family planning and had some control over fertility, whereas birth control
is presumably looser for families with fathers born before 1930 (i.e. fathers in
the Old cohort). The results of Table 4, therefore, also provide information
concerning the eﬀects of family planning on our study. The fact that both
columns of Table 4 support the SSAD sibship eﬀects on family education
resource allocation suggests that changes in the “practice of birth control”
cannot explain away our ﬁndings on the importance of SSAD.
226.4 Cohort Eﬀects
A main ﬁnding discussed earlier is that the sibship eﬀects are much stronger
when siblings are more than 8 years apart. Children with much-older siblings
beneﬁt the most, while those with much-younger siblings are at a disadvan-
tage. A possible explanation for the ﬁndings is due to birth cohorts. That
is, respondents with much-younger siblings were born early and had fewer
years of schoolings, whereas respondents with much-older siblings were born
late and had more years of schooling.
To examine this possibility, we add in the birth cohort dummies and
rerun the regressions. The results given in Table 5 show that all the cohort
dummies are highly signiﬁcant. And in comparison with the results in the All
column of Table 3, some signiﬁcant sibship variables in Table 3 turn out to be
insigniﬁcant in Table 5. However, younger siblings with age diﬀerence more
than 8 years are still signiﬁcant. The column [All-(2)] of Table 5 gives the
results when the cohort’s average years of schooling is used as an additional
explanaroty variable. Again, this addition does not alter the results of our
analysis. These results show that our ﬁndings concerning SSAD are quite
robust under diﬀerent settings.
Insert Table 5 about here.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we propose a Sex, Seniority, and Age Diﬀerence (SSAD) model
for studying family education resource allocation. We argue that because
siblings of diﬀerent sex-seniority-age diﬀerence combinations may have dis-
tinct implications in family resource allocations, it is inappropriate to mingle
these variables into a sibship or birth-order variable in empirical analysis.
Our theoretical investigation shows that a crucial variable that diﬀerentiates
23the various impacts is the age diﬀerence between two siblings. When the eco-
nomic environment the parents face is at the margin, they tend to sacriﬁce
their elder female child’s education opportunity, especially when the younger
sibling is a boy with a larger age diﬀerence.
Based on our theoretical framework, we set up an empirical framework
accordingly. Statistical tests generally cannot reject our hypotheses. Com-
paring our results with that available in the literature, we show that siblings
with distinct characteristics have positive or negative eﬀects on a child’s
education opportunity. Without diﬀerentiating the seniority-sex-age distinc-
tions, the estimates associated with a mingled variable “sibship” may be
seriously diluted, or even become insigniﬁcant. We believe that our reﬁned
framework and empirical analysis can help clarify the problem of family re-
source allocation and explain the diﬀerences in previous research.
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27Appendix: Formal Propositions
Note: This Appendix is not part of this paper, and will be provided
on a website available for interested readers in the future.
Given a pair of (E1;E2) and subject to the constraint in (2), let the
maximum utility derived from (1) be W(E1;E2).
Proposition 1 (Disadvantage of the elder child): Suppose assumptions (A1)
and (A2) hold. If V (1;0) = V (0;1), then W(0;1)  W(1;0) > 0: Further-
more, W(0;1)  W(1;0) increases in ∆A.
Proof of Propositions 1: Consider the scenario with E1 = 1 and E2 = 0;
and suppose the optimal consumption path derived is c
t and the correspond-
ing saving path is s
t. Since E1 = 1 by assumption, the parent must spend
p during the period between t = 0 and t = 4. Now consider the alternative
with E1 = 0 so that p is saved for t 2 [0;4]. Suppose the parent consumes
c0
t  c
t + and saves s0
t  s
t +(p) for t 2 [0;4], where  is a small positive
amount.18 The present value of this extra savings ﬂow is
R 4
0 (p  )ertdt,
which at the time when the second child is going to college (which is time


















Comparing (X1) and (X2), we see that as long as  is small enough,  1 >  2
must hold. Thus, as far as the family budget is concerned, sending the second
18It may be the case that college expenses rise with time, so that p is an increasing
function of time. It can be easily shown that as long as the appreciation rate of p is less
than or equal to the interest rate r, then our analysis remains valid.
28instead of the ﬁrst child to college can enlarge the household’s feasible set (the
postponement eﬀect). Furthermore, the parent can actually do even better,
because the consumption plan c
t +  is not yet the optimal plan. Since the
parent is indiﬀerent between the two children, the ﬁrst part of proposition 1
is proved.
¿From (X1) and (X2), it is easy to see that  1   2 is increasing in
∆A. This implies that the ﬁnancial advantage of sacriﬁcing the ﬁrst child
enlarges as ∆A increases. Because W(1;0) is independent of ∆A and W(0;1)
increases in ∆A, W(0;1)  W(1;0) also increases in ∆A.
Proposition 2: Suppose assumptions (A1) and (A2) hold. For any given
E1(= 0 or 1), W(0;1)  W(1;0) increases in ∆A.
Proof of Proposition 2: For any given E1 = 0 or 1, if the parent considers
a change from E2 = 0 to E2 = 1, then the extra budget deﬁcit for the parent












Evidently, when ∆A increases, the budget deﬁcit decreases. On the one
hand, the envelope theorem tells us that the drop in
R T
0 u(ct)ertdt due to
this extra budget deﬁcit decreases as D declines. On the other hand, the
change in E2 generates a utility increment of size V (E1;1)V (E1;0), which
is a constant. As such, we know that when ∆A increases, it is more likely
that V (E1;1)  V (E1;0) will outweigh the utility drop in
R T
0 u(ct)ertdt.
Proposition 3: The impact on a child C’s education opportunity from
adding a senior or junior sibling who has a small age diﬀerence with C is
ambiguous.
Proof of Proposition 3: The case is not interesting if the parents are so
rich that both B and C can go to college, or so poor that neither B nor
29C goes to college. Thus, our discussion will focus on the intermediate case
where parents may aﬀord one of the two children to go to college. To simplify
the presentation, sex preferences on the parents’ side are ignored.
Propositions 1 and 2 tell us that there exists a critical b such that if the
age diﬀerence between B and C is ∆A < b, then the probability a particular
child is sent to college is roughly 1/2. If child C goes to the labor market
and remits an amount Rt to his or her parents, the family budget constraint
becomes
ct + ntp  Mt = It + Rt + rat  ˙ at; a0 given:
Now consider child B. If he does not have a sibling C, then his parents’
initial a0 would be higher, because the resource competition between B and
C disappears. This would increase the probability of supporting B to attend
college. On the other hand, without C the ﬂow of remittance Rt would also
disappear, which reduces B’s possibility of going to college. The net impact
certainly depends on the relative size of these two eﬀects.
30 
 
Table 1. Summary of Statistics 
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Table 1. Summary of Statistics (continued) 
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Number of observations  10,764  5,393  5,371 5,964  4,800 




Table 2. The Effects of Sibship and Birth Order on Schooling 
Explanatory Variables  Entire Sample 
Constant 3.713*** 
(7.99) 




1915-1924   0.900*** 
(3.82) 
1925-1934   1.715*** 
(7.14) 
After 1935    2.638*** 
(10.41) 
Born after1956  1.066*** 
(8.60) 
Gender (Male=1)  0.996*** 
(14.80) 
Number of children  -0.225*** 
(5.83) 
Birth order  0.137* 
(1.95) 
Birth order squared  0.027** 
(2.46) 
Father’s schooling  0.285*** 
(17.99) 
Mother’s schooling  0.206*** 
(12.15) 
Mother’s age >=40  0.289 
(1.19) 
Working mother  -0.330*** 
(3.01) 










2 R   0.4387 
Number of families  2,626 
Number of observations  10,764 
Note: ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively. 
Absolute t values are in the parentheses.     
 
                   
Table 3. The Effects of Age-sex-specific Siblings on Years of Schooling 


































Gender (Male=1)  1.015***
(15.05) 
— — 
Number of elder brothers with       
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Table 3. The Effects of Age-sex-specific Siblings on Years of schooling (continued) 
Explanatory Variables  All  Female  Male 











































2 R   0.4434 0.5016 0.3753 
Number  of  families  2,626 2,318 2,423 
Number  of  observations  10,764 5,393 5,371 
Note: ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively. 
Absolute t values are in the parentheses.     Table 4. The Effects of Age-sex-specific Siblings on Years of Schooling,   




















Number of elder brothers with     
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 Table 4. The Effects of Age-sex-specific Siblings on Years of Schooling,   





















2 R  0.4212  0.2721 
Number of families  1,358  1,268 
Number of observations  5,964  4,800 
Note: ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively. 
Absolute t values are in the parentheses.     
 
            
        
  
Table 5. The Effects of Age-sex-specific Siblings on Years of Schooling: 
          Birth  Cohort  Dummies  Included  
Explanatory Variables  All-(1)  All-(2) 




Cohort’s average years of schooling  —  0.636*** 
(21.88) 
Birth cohort     
Before 1950 (ref)  —  — 
1950-1959  1.765*** 
(12.34) 
— 
1960-1969  3.000*** 
(18.20) 
— 
After 1970    3.501*** 
(19.95) 
— 
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    Table 5. The Effects of Age-sex-specific Siblings on Years of Schooling: 
         Birth  Cohort  Dummies  Included  (continued) 
Explanatory Variables  All-(1)  All-(2) 
















Father’s ethnicity     
Aboriginesref 
 
—  — 












2 R  0.4449  0.4536 
Number of families  2,626  2,626 
Number of observations  10,764  10,764 
Note: ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively. 
Absolute t values are in the parentheses.     
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